4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 tions" on the basis of race, the treaties recognize the permissibility of "differentiation" to promote affirmative action.
With respect to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee created by the treaty, recognized that " [n] ot every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant." 6 The Committee added:
[T]he principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the [ICCPR] .... Such action may involve granting for a time . . . certain preferential treatment in specific matters....
[A]s long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the [ICCPR] .7 Further, when ratifying the ICCPR, the United States adopted the "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," 8 [Report or Understanding] . This formal Understanding permits certain forms of affirmative action. It states in pertinent part: "The United States understands distinctions based upon race . . . -as those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph 1 and Article 26-to be permitted [when] such distinctions are, at [a] minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." 9 In a previous essay, I documented why the "Understanding"
5 See Paust, supra note 1, at 661-63, 667-71. [hereinafter Senate Committee Report] . In the Report, it was noted that the Committee created by the Covenant had interpreted the Covenant to allow certain forms of "differentiation:"
In interpreting the relevant Covenant provisions, the Human Rights Committee has observed that not all differentiation in treatment constitutes discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate tinder the Covenant. In its General Comment on nondiscrimination, for example, the Committee noted that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical treatment in every instance. Id. at 655; see Paust, supra note 1, at 662-63 n.12.
9 Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 655.
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operates as a reservation to the Covenant and why this reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR, as well as its authoritative interpretation by the Human Rights Committee. " ' As such, the Understanding affirms that certain forms of racebased affirmative action are permitted as a matter of United States treaty law, that is, they are permitted whenever such distinctions are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." Moreover, at a minimum, the Report is a formal expression of federal policy expressing the permissibility of affirmative action.'
2
The other significant treaty, the Race Discrimination Convention," is clearly useful as supreme federal law authorizing certain forms of race-based affirmative action. As its name suggests, the treaty contains general provisions outlawing racial discrimination. Nevertheless, certain "special measures," which may include racebased affirmative action, are expressly excluded from the definition of proscribed racial "discrimination." For example, the Racial Discrimination Convention states in paragraph 4 of Article 1:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." 4 There is no exception or limitation expressly related to this article elsewhere in the treaty. Indeed, the statement of Conrad K. Harper, a Legal Adviser at the United States Department of State, concerning ratification of the treaty, included the following assessment: "[A]rticle 1 (4) explicitly exempts 'special measures' taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection. As a result, the Convention leaves undisturbed existing U.S. law regarding affirmative action programs. 
1998]
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Article 2 of the Race Discrimination Convention lends support to the propriety of certain special measures, even creating duties to take special and concrete measures of affirmative action "when the circumstances so warrant." 6 Furthermore, Article 5 may be interpreted to prohibit "discrimination" and "distinctions," but not "differentiations." 7 Nor are "special measures" for adequate advancement of racial or ethnic groups and individuals mandated.' 8 As Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen aptly summarize: The Convention's broad formulation of forbidden acts is not, however, intended to prescribe that all differentiations are unlawful discriminations. The differences made impermissible are those which fail to establish a demonstrable, rational relation to individual potentialities for self-development and contribution to the aggregate common interest. The basic requirement of rationality, that is, an absence of arbitrariness, is implicit in the reference in Article 1 (1) . . . and is made explicit in Articles 1 (4) and 2 (2).'t Thus, it can be recognized that the use of the terms "distinction" and "discrimination" in the ICCRP and the Race Discrimination Convention require the conclusion that not all forms of differentiation 20 are impermissible, and that race-based affirmative action may be required under both treaties. 2 '
B. CERTAIN METHODS OF INCORPORATION
Given the permissibility of affirmative action under the treaties as they are incorporated in United States law, how may one use human rights law to provide more meaningful and effective equality of opportunities in higher education? Here, I will address three strategies which, I term: (1) the interpretive approach; (2) the primacy and preemption approach; and (3) the enhancement and protection of state implementary choice approach.
The Interpretive Approach
The first method involves the utilization of treaty law as an aid for interpretation and enhancement of constitutional rights, duties, and powers, thus, a form of indirect incorporation. 2 2 Through this method, the treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action and related duties can be used to influence constitutional norms, an approach that should prove useful against attempted extensions of Hopwood v. Texas. 23 For example, when considering the phrase "equal protection" (found in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the ICCPR), one would utilize treaty interpretations that clearly allow for certain forms of affirmative action. The word "protection" should be interpreted in a manner that allows for certain measures of affirmative action to promote an "equal" and effective "protection" against ongoing discrimination. 24 Further, since international law is supreme law of the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to preclude any state from denying "the equal protection of the laws" by failing to recognize the protection of treaty laws embodied 22 See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 34, 83, 108, 112-13, 191-96, 246, 248-56 (1996) L. REv. 423, 462 (1997) . 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996 ), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2580 (1996 . Even Hopwood did not require that laws treat and protect each person at every social moment in exactly the same way. See id. at 946-47. The latter approach might lead to a denial of the constitutional propriety of any laws protecting special interests or distinctions, such as certain tax codes, welfare laws, pollution laws, laws providing government subsidies, laws providing judicial and official immunities, and laws concerning the selection of judges.
24 Both "equality" and "protection" should be viewed as processes and judged with reference to all relevant interests and legal policies at stake. Thus, equality should be viewed in context and through time, not merely in connection with isolated circumstances, a limited number of persons, or a particular moment in time. Such an approach will allow fuller inquiry into various interconnected legal policies at stake and the consequences of choice. For example, a deeper, richer understanding of equality and protection of the laws in connection with law school admission processes will involve attention to many more features of context than mathmaticized weightings of grade point averages (which are themselves products of diverse institutions, majors, and educational experiences) and LSAT scores.
in permissible affirmative action. 25 Treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action provides the necessary compelling state interest component of the strict scrutiny test applied to racial classifications, 26 especially coupled with the United States' duties under Article 2 of the Race Discrimination Convention. 2 7 Moreover, the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause obligates the states to the treaties so that the dual duties and interests provide a greater compulsion of state interest. 28 Even in Hopwood, several judges stressed that diversity in higher education can be a compelling state interest. 29 Treatybased permissibility of affirmative action and duties to take special and concrete measures must necessarily enhance such a recognition.
The Primacy and Preemption Approaches
Another method for the permissibility of affirmative action involves the utilization of the Supremacy Clause 3 ' to override state or 25 Concerning the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect human rights, see PAUST, supra note 22, at 179-80, 186, 193, 196, 237, 244, 248, 255-56, 315 31 See Paust, supra note 1, at 671. There, I also note that although the instrument of ratification for each treaty contains a declaration that many of the articles are "nonself-executing," such declarations function as reservations that are fundamentally inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the treaties and, under international law, are thus void ab initio. See Paust, supra note 1 at 671 & n. 43-44; PAUST, supra note 22, at 361-86. Moreover, the declaration concerning the International Covenant merely addresses Articles 1-27 and expressly does not apply to Article 50. Article 50 mandates: "The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions." Such "shall" language is mandatory and self-executory. See also PAUST, supra note 22, at 55-59, 62, 69-71, 74, 110, 112 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred.") (citations omitted); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448-49 (1924) ("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed tinder it, as we are bound to do .... ) (citation omitted); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 272 (1890); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred.") (citation omitted); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?"); PAUST, supra note 22, at 72 n.83, 110 n.13.
Further, because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution includes all treaties, a declaration of non-self-execution is unavoidably unconstitutional and void under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g. PAUST 49, 64, 67-69 (1997) . Certainly a mere declaration by the President, even with fill consent of the Senate, cannot alter a constitutional command.
Importantly also, the declaration concerning the Covenant is not a general declaration of non-self-execution, but one that is expressly limited and does not inhibit the reach of Article 50. Further, it has a special and limited meaning: merely "to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts." Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 657. Thus, even if the declaration was operative, the Senate Committee Report assures that the declaration does not make the Covenant generally non-self-executing (i.e., it was intended to be partly self-executing) and that it does not generally inhibit the legal status of the Covenant as supreme federal law sized in United States v. Pink, 3 2 "state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty ... [and] for use by federal and state courts, as long as the Covenant is not used directly to create a cause of action.
Even if portions were "non-self-executing" in a general sense or in the special sense preferred by the Executive upon adoption (relating merely to the creation of a private cause of action directly under the treaties), the treaties should still trump inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the doctrine of federal preemption. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (BlackJ., concurring) (human rights articles in the U.N. Charter, which to date have not been found to be self-executing, provide additional reasons why a California law "stands as an obstacle to the free accomplishment of our policy in the international field" and cannot prevail); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Its inconsistency with the Charter . . .is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned."); Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 5,611) (stating that a seemingly non-self-executing treaty "is supreme" over a state constitution); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 293 (1854) (held that all treaties are supreme law over that of the stateseven those requiring "enactment of a statute to regulate the details"); PAUST Additionally, generally non-self-executing treaties can be used indirectly as aids for interpretation of other laws, defensively in civil or criminal contexts, for supremacy or preemptive purposes, or to provide a compelling state interest. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 22, at 62-64, 68, 97-98, 134-35, 370, 377-78 n.4, 384; de ] , 51-57, 62-64, 67-68 nn.35 & 42, 92, 97, 133-35 nn.81 & 84, 143, 202, 314, 384 n.72, 386 n.100, 413. 34 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 50.
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The '' 3 5 The successful effort in California to outlaw affirmative action should not have prevailed because it is both inconsistent with human rights treaties and federal policy assuring the permissibility of affirmative action. 6
The Enhancement and Protection of State Implementay Choice
The third method recognizes the authority of states within the United States and various municipal entities to execute human rights treaties in a manner that more adequately assures affirmative action and enriches the process of equality. Instruments ratified by the United States contain a federal clause.1 7 Even though the instruments acknowledge that federal jurisdiction ends where state and local government jurisdiction begins, these clauses do not make the human rights treaties inapplicable as federal law. 3 " On the contrary, the understandings allow state participation by effectuating choice while they also assure concurrent duties to implement the treaties through federal and state processes. Thus, the clauses create an overall responsibility for implementation in the federal government and guarantee that, at a minimum, states cannot deny human rights based in the treaties. 9 The ICCPR's federal clause is typical. It reads:
[T] his Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfill- 567, 576-77 (1997) .
39 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 263; Paust, supra note 1, at 673-74; Elizabeth Landry, Note, States as International Law-Breakers: Discrimination Against Immigrants and Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1095 , 1116 -17 (1996 . vation exempting constituent units might readily be characterized as contrary to the object and purpose of the Article, if not the [ICCPR] as a whole." 4 "
With respect to the Race Discrimination Convention, the duty to take action is even stronger. Article 2 (2) of the treaty requires the United States, "when the circumstances so warrant," to take "special and concrete measures" of affirmative action.' 4 Under the federal clause, it may be left to the discretion of the United States to exercise its jurisdictional competence in mandating special measures or to allow states to proceed. In the event that the states do not proceed, the United States is consequently bound by Article 2 of the Race Discrimination Convention to take action. In other words, there is no gap in the United States duty under Article 2; the Unites States still retains its duty, in spite of the fact that neither the states nor federal governmental entities have proceeded to adopt special measures.
5
Individual states cannot deny the permissibility of affirmative action assured under the treaties. Indeed, the federal clauses require that the treaties "shall be implemented ... otherwise by the state and local governments," thereby making duties under the treaties concurrent. Thus, the federal clause of the ICCPR, in conjunction with both Article 50 of the ICCPR and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, compel states and substate entities to execute and effectuate the treaty by choosing among affirmative and permissible options while not denying rights under the ICCPR. Likewise, the federal clause of the Race 2-3, paras. 9, 11-12 (1995) , which recognized the U.S. Government's "readiness ... to take such further measures as may be necessary to ensure that the States of the Union implement the rights guaranteed by the Covenant" and the "assurances of the Government that its declaration regarding the federal system is not a reservation and is not intended to affect the international obligations of the United States.").
44 Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4, at 218. 45 See Stewart, supra note 43, at 1201-02 (the U.S. remains bound under the Covenant, the U.S. will also "ensure that the state and local governments fulfill their obligations," and the Understanding "concerns the steps to be taken domestically by the respective federal and state authorities").
Discrimination Convention, coupled with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, compel the same.
Equally important is the fact that nothing in either of the federal clauses prohibit state or municipalities from executing or further implementing the treaties. The clauses recognize and confer a concurrent power to do so, especially in the phrases: "shall be implemented... otherwise by the state and local governments... to the extent that the state and local governments exercise jurisdiction," and "to the end that competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfillment of the Covenant."
Thus, each federal clause delegates and guarantees the ability of state and local authorities to take positive steps in seeking equality through affirmative action, and to have those choices protected as long as they are otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the federal clauses provide state and local abilities to participate in treaty effectuation in ways that might otherwise have been suspect under more inhibiting notions of federal preemption. 6 The new implementary freedom guaranteed under the treaty regimes encourages participation and provides an opportunity for states and sub-state entities to choose affirmative action programs in higher education and in other fields or processes. This newer flexibility makes sense when affirmative action is limited to reasonable need, and circumstances vary in different states. Local authorities may then choose among the permissible option that it is most 46 See Harper, supra note 15, at 726 ("This is to make clear that ratification does not preempt State and local anti-discrimination initiatives. The understanding also makes clear that where States and localities have jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal government will ensure compliance."); Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 657 ("intended... that the U.S. will implement... by appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or state as appropriate, and that the Federal Government will remove an), federal inhibition to the States' abilities to meet their obligations."); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 263-64 (an "invitation to state authorities to: (1) provide appropriate state remedies for treaty norms; (2) assess potential preemption . . . ; (3) absorb international human rights norms into the common law lawmaking enterprise; and (4) turn to international law benchmarks in interpreting both state constitutions and statutes."); Landry, supra note 39, at 1116-17 ("expression of the affirmative obligation of the states to implement the provisions of the Covenant
.. ..").
More generally, states can experiment within the contours of logical and policyserving meaning of a treaty norm as long as there is no denial of the core of settled meaning.
[Vol. 3:91 appropriate to their needs. Such delegated discretion is especially appropriate for public colleges and universities that face academic choices, such as, who should participate in the learning process as students or faculty members. 4 7 Given the fact that such academic choice is supported by compelling state interests, supplemented by treaty law, as well as the related authority recognized in the federal clauses, it should now be easier to defend colleges and universities when their choices become the focus of domestic litigation. We can help to "bring human rights home" by participating in amicus briefs when colleges and universities are sued. 47 In turn, public colleges and universities have been delegated the power and responsibility held by the states to make these types of choice with respect to educational processes.
